redress systematic wrongdoing by large-scale defendants, 5 but because it signals something of a paradigm shift in the law of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 6 preemption. Because the facts of Concepcion are now well known, I recite only those details relevant to my argument: The Concepcions signed up for AT&T service, which AT&T advertised as coming with a free phone. Although they received the free phone, the Concepcions were charged an additional $30.22 in sales tax based on the phone's retail value, so they filed a putative class action against AT&T for fraud and false advertising. When AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in its customer agreement, the Concepcions argued that the clause was unconscionable under a 2005 precedent from the California Supreme Court by the name of Discover Bank v. Superior Court. 7 Discover Bank held that collective action waivers (whether in arbitration or litigation) are presumptively unconscionable when they are found in [1] a consumer contract of adhesion [2] in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and [3] when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money. 8 The district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Concepcions and, moreover, held that Discover Bank was not preempted by the FAA. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed these lower court preemption holdings.
This Article proceeds as follows. I begin Part I with what I think of as the puzzle of Concepcion: Notwithstanding the majority's declarations to the contrary, Concepcion represents a significant break from the traditional justifications offered for FAA preemption of state law. What, then, is the explanation for the Court's decision to preempt Discover Bank? In Part II, I offer an answer: Concepcion turns on what I have elsewhere described as an antidiscrimination theory of FAA preemption. Understanding how that theory plays out both in the majority's decision and in the parties' briefing of the issues will, I argue, help account for many aspects of the opinion that have so far been left unexplained.
To say that Concepcion is animated by an antidiscrimination theory of the FAA does not, however, imply anything about the nature of that theory or whether the Court got it correct. In Part III, I demonstrate that even though the theory has routinely been invoked over the past three decades to legitimize the FAA's displacement of state law, it remains vastly underdeveloped and poorly understood. From this point of view, the problem with Concepcion is less that a majority of the Court decided the case based on ideology or policy preferences, as many have argued, 9 and more that the lack of any clear standards or limits to the antidiscrimination theory leaves the theory prone to abuse in whichever direction the wind happens to blow. In Part IV, I draw on the collective learning in the antidiscrimination area to critique the Court's opinion and to suggest that, with a more sophisticated understanding of what it means to discriminate against arbitration, the result in Concepcion would and should have been very different.
I. THE PUZZLE OF CONCEPCION
To understand the puzzle at the core of Concepcion, it will be necessary first to review the law of FAA preemption. FAA preemption is a species of conflict preemption, pursuant to which state law will be displaced if and only if it somehow conflicts with or "stands as an obstacle" to the text or purpose of a federal statute. 10 The text of FAA section 2 provides that a "[1] written provision . . . to submit [specified disputes] to arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, [2] save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 11 The first clause of section 2 has generally been understood as a mandate to "rigorously enforce" 12 arbitration agreements "according to their terms." 13 Following Richard Nagareda, I refer to this as the "command clause." 14 Any state law that stands as an obstacle to the command clause will be preempted by the FAA. For example, where the parties' agreement contains an agreement to arbitrate any and all disputes, a state law that prohibits the arbitration of wage disputes will be preempted because it prevents enforcement of the agreement strictly as written. 15 The second clause of section 2 contains the only exceptions to the command clause thus far recognized by the Court. This so-called "savings clause" has widely been understood as allowing states to regulate arbitration agreements so long as they do so using "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability." 16 As the Court put it, "if [a state] law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally," then the law is not preempted. 17 Applications of the unconscionability defense to invalidate arbitration clauses have for this reason almost uniformly avoided preemption, even when the application is alleged to "single out" arbitration agreements for unfavorable treatment.
As part of California's common law of unconscionability, Discover Bank fell within the savings clause and for this reason should have been spared from preemption according to the principles outlined above. But the Court did just the opposite. Concepcion therefore violates much of what we thought we knew about the interaction between the command and savings clauses.
To be sure, conflict preemption is not limited to situations in which the state law collides head-on with the plain language of a federal statute; it also covers situations in which the state law is consistent with the statutory text but nonetheless frustrates the text's "'purposes and objectives.'" 19 Concepcion might, therefore, be understood as making this type of determination about Discover Bank. To see whether this is the case, we must first come to grips with the purposes and objectives behind section 2's command and savings clauses.
Perhaps the leading view is that those clauses, and the FAA more generally, seek to honor arbitration agreements qua contracts. 20 "Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the [FAA] is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement." 21 State laws are accordingly preempted when they undermine the enforceability of arbitration agreements. I refer to this as the "contract theory." Another view, which might be referred to as the "favoritism theory," holds that state laws are preempted if they disfavor arbitration or arbitration agreements. Most commentators (both critical and supportive of the opinion) appear to believe that Concepcion can be squared with one or both of these purposes and objectives. 
A. The Twilight of Contract
Prior to the enactment of the FAA in 1925, it was virtually impossible to compel arbitration of disputes. The traditional explanation is that early common law courts, jealous of competition from private adjudicative forums, had devised artificial rules that thwarted the enforcement of promises to arbitrate for no apparent reason other than an "irrational," "unjust," and "anachronis[tic]" hostility toward the arbitral process. On the contract theory, the "basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act [was] to overcome [these] refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate." 24 The rationale is that there is little defensible basis for enforcing an arbitration agreement with less determination than any other contract. 25 This is why arbitration agrements may be regulated only through rules that "arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally" 26 not through rules like the old common law ouster and revocability doctrines that applied only to arbitration agreements. 27 Thus, "[s]uccessful challenges to arbitration [agreements] must find their basis in contract law, not some other source of law" like employment or consumer protection law. 28 Consistent with the contract theory, the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Concepcion reasoned that Discover Bank avoided preemption because it was nothing more than a judicial precedent for the application of the common law unconscionability defense. 29 But the Court reached the opposite conclusion. It held that Discover Bank conflicted with section 2's "overarching purpose to 'ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. '" 30 Although this may sound consistent with the contract theory, on closer inspection it is not. The only way to square the Court's conclusion with the contract view is if the Discover Bank rule somehow does not qualify as a generally applicable contract defense-for example, because it is a rogue version of unconscionability otherwise unknown to the common law of contracts. During briefing on certiorari and on the merits, AT&T and its amici pressed this very point, arguing that the California rule was a "distortion" that "b[ore] no resemblance" to traditional unconscionability law. 31 This argument did not win the day, however. It was rejected in no uncertain terms by justices on both sides of the aisle during oral argument, 32 and it was also quietly dismissed in the Court's opinion. After noting that general unconscionability requires both a procedural and a substantive element, for instance, the majority concluded that Discover Bank had in fact "applied 24 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) this framework" fair and square to class action waivers. 33 Indeed, any other conclusion would have put the Court in the deeply problematic posture of accusing the final arbiter of California law of misapprehending its own doctrine of unconscionability when it decided Discover Bank. The Court therefore had little choice but to accept Discover Bank as a bona fide principle of state contract law.
Concepcion therefore amounts to the proposition that a perfectly valid application of a generally applicable contract doctrine is nonetheless preempted by the FAA.
34 This is evident in Justice Scalia's remark that "[a]lthough § 2's savings clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." 35 In other words, it is possible for a state-law rule to frustrate the FAA even if it counts as generally applicable. This is a complete and substantial break from the contract theory. If there was one thing that had seemed settled, it was that the FAA's commitment to arbitration as a creature of contract meant that arbitration agreements would be made "enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." 36 Concepcion changed all of that overnight. 37 If FAA preemption no longer turns on whether the state law is a genuine contract law defense, the contract paradigm cannot fully explain FAA preemption after Concepcion. A fortiori, it no longer captures the purposes and objectives of the FAA in quite the same way it did before. Something else, therefore, must be at work.
Here it is often retorted that Concepcion is perfectly consistent with the contract theory because the Court enforced the collective action waiver in AT&T's customer agreement strictly according to its terms, Discover Bank notwithstanding. 38 The problem with this retort is that it confuses the contract paradigm with one based on freedom of contract. The Court's decision might well be described as consistent with freedom of contract insofar as it displaced a state rule that limited the parties' prerogative to "structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit."
39
But that is not the same as the contract theory's emphasis on "bring[ing] private contractual arbitration agreements into general contract law" 40 -that is, on holding arbitration contracts to the same requirements of validity and enforceability imposed on other contracts. Far from synonymous with the ideal of unbridled private autonomy, contract law represents a continuing endeavor to balance that ideal against the protection of public values. This is why, as far back as the classical period, the common law singled out a variety of contracts and contract provisions for 33 regulation in the public interest. 41 Even during the height of the Lochner era, courts never pretended to enforce contracts exactly as written. 42 Moreover, it is not even clear that Concepcion is consistent with freedom of contract. Many would argue that consumers are not in any real sense "free" when they acquiesce to terms contained in adhesion contracts like AT&T's service agreement. 43 If so, preempting Discover Bank would seem to exacerbate rather than mitigate this unfreedom. It is also doubtful whether a law such as Discover Bank can be understood as reducing liberty of contract simply because it interferes with the parties' agreement as written, and thus whether displacing Discover Bank tends to increase that liberty. 44 For example, would we consider contracting parties to be freer if the state held them to an agreement that had been procured by fraud or duress? 45 An agreement that turns out to be impracticable? Or one that lacks consideration? The lesson here is that common law defenses such as unconscionability can do just as much to augment freedom of contract as they can to diminish it. Taken to its logical terminus, the retort leads to the untenable proposition that contracts should be enforced just for the sake of enforcement, no matter what their effect on other values such as voluntary consent, procedural fairness, or the reasonable expectations of the parties.
B. The Twilight of Favoritism
A discussion of the favoritism theory cannot proceed without resolving a threshold question about the supposed object of favoritism: Does the FAA seek to favor arbitration or arbitration agreements? The Court has used both formulations interchangeably, 46 which in turn enables lower courts to exploit the indeterminacy to justify FAA preemption outcomes based on policy rather than principle. To be sure, it is entirely possible to favor both the arbitration process 41 45 Richard Epstein, among others, has argued that economic duress, nondisclosure, the statute of frauds, and certain applications of the doctrine of capacity are not in fact consistent with the freedom of contract ideal. See id. at 297-302. This would suggest that many general contract defenses currently presumed to fall within the savings clause might become problematic if freedom of contract were taken to be the touchstone for FAA preemption. 46 The lack of precision here is truly astounding. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-81 (1989) (noting the FAA's policy of "strongly favor[ing] the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate" and later referring to favoritism of "arbitration proceedings" as a "method of resolving disputes"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625, 630 (1985) (explaining that the "'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' . . . is at bottom a policy guaranteeing enforcement of private contractual arrangements" and then relying on the "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution"); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting at once that Section 2 embodies a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" and that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."). and the agreements that give rise to it. Nonetheless, I shall argue that the best interpretation of the theory is that federal arbitration law seeks to favor arbitration qua process, not qua contract. There are at least three reasons why.
First, one of the main objectives of the FAA was to overturn the old "revocability" doctrine, 47 which allowed a reluctant party to revoke her promise to arbitrate existing or future disputes at any time prior to issuance of the award. Revocability does not go to the question of whether the arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable, because the non-revoking party was always entitled to money damages for breach. 48 Instead, because the right of revocation simply prevents a court from ordering specific performance of the promise to arbitrate, revocability goes only to the question of remedy-whether a court may compel resort to the arbitration process.
49 A significant part of the FAA's charge, therefore, was the vindication of arbitration as a process rather than a promise.
Second, favoring arbitration agreements is better understood as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. 50 If arbitration agreements were ends in themselves, there would be little more for the FAA to do beyond reversing the old ouster doctrine, which made pre-dispute arbitration agreements void. The validity of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement could then be enforced by the award of money damages without so much as a single arbitration proceeding ever taking place. 51 But the FAA does so much more: Among other things, it creates procedures for compelling arbitration, for staying or barring related litigation, for appointing arbitrators and conducting hearings, for enforcing arbitral awards as court judgments, and for vacating and 47 This is one of the chief reasons why the command clause makes arbitration clauses falling within its purview "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9 U.S. modifying such awards. 52 The FAA's true object of concern, therefore, is not so much the agreement itself as the process that the agreement makes possible. 53 Third, it is difficult to appreciate what it means to favor arbitration agreements other than eliminating needless impediments to their enforcement. 54 But if so, this begins to sound much like the contract theory's emphasis on "rigorously enforc[ing]" such agreements. To avoid redundancy, therefore, the favoritism theory is best interpreted as directed toward the arbitration process.
If the foregoing is correct, Concepcion is anything but favorable to arbitration. As many of us have already noted, 55 the opinion is infected to the core with the very same limiting beliefs about arbitration that the Court has spent the better part of three decades attempting to debunk. "Arbitration," the majority declared, "is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation." 56 "Arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification," so that it is "at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties' due process rights are satisfied." 57 Unlike the de novo review of class certification questions available in court, arbitrators' class certification decisions are not appealable. 58 And although the resulting award is subject to the FAA's vacatur standards, those standards amount to "no effective means of review."
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In an early line of cases, the Court used similar uncharitable assessments about arbitration to undo valid, broadly-worded arbitration agreements. 60 67 Concepcion is further unfavorable toward arbitration because it tends to close off new possibilities-possibilities consistent with the early reformers' desire to "raise arbitration to the status and dignity of judicial process." 68 In large part, modern FAA jurisprudence has been a jurisprudence of enablement. The "'national policy favoring arbitration'" 69 has been joined at the hip with a trend toward greater inclusiveness with respect to the scope of disputes covered by an arbitration agreement, 70 74 and in this way represents a profoundly disabling moment in the history of modern arbitration law. 75 Arbitration and the class mechanism are conceived as static and brittle, unable to evolve in new directions or to accommodate one another as times change. As a result, a distinctive process of collective claiming-one responsive to not just to the weaknesses but also to the strengths of the arbitral forum-is unlikely to see the light of day. 76 This does not just mean that there will be fewer class arbitrations; ironically, it also means that there will also be fewer individual arbitrations. 77 As Justice Breyer put it, "What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?" 78 This cannot possibly be favorable to arbitration's future development. Those who persist in the belief that Concepcion is pro-arbitration make one of two errors. The first is to confuse the policy of favoring arbitration with that of favoring arbitration agreements. But rules that disfavor the strict enforcement of arbitration agreements, such as the unconscionability defense and the statutory and common law vacatur rules, play an important role in underwriting the legitimacy of the arbitration process. 79 Consider a hypothetical law that would limit the enforceability of patently unfair arbitration agreements, like the agreement at issue in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips. 80 Preempting such a law would certainly favor arbitration agreements, but would we so easily conclude that it thereby favors arbitration?
The second error is to confuse favoring arbitration with favoring the big businesses that are most apt to use it. 81 It is difficult to quarrel with the observation that Concepcion favors big business, especially those keen on avoiding collective action claims (in arbitration or litigation).
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But that is not the same as saying that it favors arbitration. Consider in this vein the one thousand or so duplicative arbitrations filed late last year by plaintiffs' law firms on behalf of AT&T customers seeking to block AT&T's announced merger with T-Mobile. 83 Instead of honoring its own agreement to arbitrate, AT&T filed multiple actions in federal court seeking to block even these individual arbitrations. It argued that arbitrating these disputes (whether individually or as a class) would cause it irreparable injury, in part because arbitrators would be called on to evaluate "highly sophisticated and complex econometric and engineering models" and conduct "a detailed assessment of this evidence as it relates to the benefits to consumers and businesses"-tasks that presumably cannot be expected from an essentially fast, cheap, and simple adjudicative forum.
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These statements may have come from the mouthpiece of arbitration's supposed champion, but they certainly do not favor arbitration. They are better seen as embodying the type of limiting beliefs that the Court's own jurisprudence in this area has sought to overturn. 84 Complaint at ¶ 6, Gonnello, 2011 WL 4716617. Although these statements are highly suspect, the same is not necessarily true of AT&T's argument that an arbitral forum would not sufficiently protect the interests of the public and third parties who were not signatories to AT&T's arbitration agreement. The latter argument is based on unavoidable structural limitations of the arbitral forum rather than on a mistrust of the competence of arbitrators or the arbitration process, and for this reason does not appear to pose the same danger of hostility. Cf. Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1250-54. 85 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
II.

CONCEPCION THROUGH THE LENS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION
If contract and favoritism do not provide a persuasive account of Concepcion, what does? One answer may be that the decision is unabashedly political and abandons all pretense of a reasoned justification.
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Against this view, I wish to suggest that Concepcion remains faithful to the general obstacle preemption framework described in Part I. Rather than abandon that framework altogether, it simply brings to the fore an alternative interpretation of the FAA's purposes and objectives, and thus an alternative theory of what a state law must look like in order to stand as an obstacle to those objectives. As the title of this Article suggests, that alternative theory is grounded in the idea of antidiscrimination: of reversing the common law's unfounded "suspicion," "prejudice[]," and unjustified "hostility" toward arbitration. 87 Coming to grips with that theory and its implications for the FAA's preemptive reach will prove indispensable not just for making sense of an opinion that at first blush defies explanation, but also for developing a more ambitious critique, one that goes beyond the accusations of judicial partisanship or hypocrisy that have so far dominated commentary on the case.
To appreciate Concepcion's antidiscrimination moorings, one must dig beneath the surface. I begin, then, by exhuming the parties' briefs on the merits. What is immediately striking here is that, despite the deep ideological chasm that separated them, AT&T and the Concepcions were in complete agreement that the outcome of the case hinged on whether the state law "discriminated" against arbitration.
88 Thus, rather than challenge AT&T's contention that Discover Bank should be preempted because it "runs afoul of th[e] fundamental nondiscrimination principle" enshrined in section 2, 89 the Concepcions fully embraced it. 90 "The preemption inquiry," they concurred, "turns on whether the state law in question discriminates against arbitration."
91 The Concepcions simply disagreed that Discover Bank was discriminatory in the way that AT&T supposed.
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To be sure, framing the FAA preemption question in this way seems peculiar, perhaps even jarring. Most of us rightly doubt whether arbitration can be understood as a victim of "discrimination." Be that as it may, numerous courts and commentators have appreciated what I have elsewhere referred to as the equal opportunity underpinnings of the Court's FAA 86 See generally Reuben, supra note 2 (criticizing the Court's FAA jurisprudence, including Concepcion, as unprincipled and based on little more than judicial activism); Cliff Palefsky, Closing thoughts on the arbitration symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/closing-thoughts-on-thearbitration-symposium/. 87 89 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 28. 90 They surely did not need to do so, because it was by no means a settled proposition even among arbitration scholars that one of the "purposes and objectives" of the FAA was to reverse "discrimination" against arbitration. 91 Brief for Respondents at 17, AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09-893); see also id. at 9-10, 11, 13, 14. 92 Concepcion thus became the first case on the merits before the U.S. Supreme Court to frame the FAA preemption analysis explicitly in terms of whether the state law "discriminated" against arbitration. preemption jurisprudence. 93 And for at least a decade, commentators have criticized state unconscionability rulings using the very same antidiscrimination arguments advanced by AT&T in Concepcion.
94 My point in this Article is not to defend or attack the way in which FAA preemption doctrine has come to be organized around the idea of antidiscrimination. Instead, it is to draw attention to the undeniable fact of this organization and how it enables courts to deploy a potent rhetoric-often in ways that are internally inconsistent or incoherent-to legitimize the FAA's extraordinary displacement of state law.
95 Surprisingly, few have ventured beyond the occasional, one-line reference to the FAA as an "anti-discrimination statute" 96 or as "a kind of equal protection clause" for arbitration provisions 97 in order to explain the meaning behind those claims. As a result, the antidiscrimination foundations of federal arbitration law remain to this day poorly understood and vastly under-theorized. 98 This would prove particularly problematic in Concepcion because the precise antidiscrimination issue raised by AT&T was itself far more complex than what had previously come before the Court. 99 The Court has typically preempted state laws that purposefully target arbitration-laws that "singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status" on their face.
100 By contrast, the Discover Bank standard seeks only to regulate class waivers. It is "facially neutral"
101 both in the sense that it does not specifically mention arbitration and because it applies equally to class waivers in arbitration and litigation. The Concepcions argued that this facial neutrality rendered Discover Bank presumptively nondiscriminatory. AT&T countered that ostensibly neutral laws may nonetheless be used as a pretext for reviving the old judicial hostility toward arbitration, and that Discover Bank was a clear example of just that. 93 REV. 1919 REV. , 1955 REV. (2003 . 98 I say "federal arbitration law" rather than "the FAA" because the antidiscrimination theory arises from the Court's interpretation of the FAA and of its legislative history more so than from the text of the statute itself. See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1238, 1250, 1283. When I refer to the antidiscrimination principle of the FAA throughout this Article, therefore, I mean that principle as gleaned from FAA jurisprudence as a whole rather than from the text or original intent of the FAA in 1925. 99 Accord AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
By definition, pretextual discrimination means purposeful discrimination. 102 To describe an ostensibly neutral law as "pretextual" is not simply to claim that it happens to produce discriminatory results; rather, it is to claim that the law serves as a front for discrimination by design. Although this nuance appears to have been lost on counsel, it was immediately apparent to the justices during oral argument. Several of them, for instance, asked for a "test" that could be used to assess whether Discover Bank was in fact a "subterfuge"-that is, a "facially neutral contract law defense[] that implicitly discriminate[s] against arbitration."
103 Justice Breyer cut to the heart of the issue with the following colorful hypothetical:
I would guess it's like Switzerland having a law saying, we only buy milk from cows who are in pastures higher than 9,000 feet. That discriminates against milk from the rest of the continent. But to say we want cows that have passed the tuberculin test doesn't. . . . And here, my impression is-correct me if I am wrong-the class arbitration exists. It's . . . not like having a jury trial. You could have it in arbitration. You can have it in litigation. So where is the 9,000-foot cow, or whatever it is? Where is the discrimination? 104 Although the import of this hypothetical has remained obscure to most commentators, 105 it is made plain once we understand the underlying issue as one of pretext. The hypothetical asks whether Discover Bank is more like a rule against low altitude milk or more like one against unpasteurized milk. Both are ostensibly neutral with respect to country of origin, but we suspect only the former to be a foil for hostility toward foreign milk. Why? Because there are good reasons to discriminate against unpasteurized milk. By contrast, altitude does not bear even a prima facie relationship to any valid purpose such as national health. The apparent arbitrariness of the 9,000 foot rule, in other words, makes it more likely to be motivated by xenophobia.
106
These and other exchanges during oral argument, together with the parties' briefing of the issues, teed up the Court to resolve one and only one question: Was Discover Bank a pretext-a cover for intentional and unjustified discrimination against arbitration?
107 Although the majority never uses the word "discrimination" in its holding, 108 it effectively answers this question in the affirmative. It begins by observing that the FAA was enacted to rectify a widespread judicial 102 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) hostility toward arbitration 109 -a purpose that is just as easily frustrated by state laws that single out arbitration as by more subtle variants that nevertheless "'derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.'" 110 It then considers whether Discover Bank can be distinguished from the following "parade of horribles": (a) a rule requiring the availability of judicially monitored discovery in all public and private dispute resolution processes; (b) a rule requiring use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in such processes; or (c) a rule imposing jury fact finding in such processes. 111 The Court suggests that these facially neutral rules are problematic not so much because they might end up destroying arbitration, but because we have reason to suspect that they were specifically "aimed at destroying arbitration."
112 Our suspicions, moreover, would hardly be "fanciful, since the judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA ha[s] manifested itself in 'a great variety' of 'devices and formulas' declaring arbitration against public policy."
113 As an example of a "rationalization" for the first rule, a court could claim with a straight face that "no consumer would knowingly waive his right to full discovery, as this would enable companies to hide their wrongdoing."
114 Or, to "help avoid preemption," the third rule could be dubbed a requirement to convene "'a panel of twelve lay arbitrators.'" 115 The crux of the Court's holding is that Discover Bank is equally suspect because it is indistinguishable from any of these examples of pretextual discrimination.
Properly understood, Concepcion thus stands for the proposition that Discover Bank somehow purposefully discriminates against arbitration. Many other commentators both within and outside of this Symposium have made the same observation, although they often employ the term "hostility" rather than "discrimination." 116 By locating Concepcion within an antidiscrimination paradigm, I do not mean to say that the contract and favoritism theories are no longer relevant. Contract and favoritism are important and enduring themes, not just in federal arbitration law but also in antidiscrimination theory. But as FAA preemption has increased in complexity, bringing within its purview not just state laws that single out arbitration but also those that are facially neutral, the older theories have begun to lose some of their explanatory power. Courts and litigants have more openly embraced antidiscrimination as an alternative 109 Id. at 1745, 1747 (majority opinion). 110 Id. at 1746 (quotation omitted). This is very similar to the standard the Court has articulated in more traditional purpose-based antidiscrimination contexts. There, the fact that employers or state actors knew or could have foreseen that a protected group would be adversely affected by the law or measure in question is generally insufficient to prove intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Frazier v. Garrison, 980 F.2d 1514, 1526-27 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, the law or measure must somehow take its meaning from the fact that a protected group will be adversely affected, in the sense that it was designed at least in part "because of, not merely in spite of," its impact on the group. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 111 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. To be sure, neither Discover Bank nor any of these hypothetical laws "requires" or "imposes" anything in arbitration; it simply prohibits the waiver of certain procedural mechanisms such as class actions. See infra note 273. I use this particular formulation for the sake of simplicity only. 112 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (emphasis added). 113 Id. 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 See, e.g., Marks, supra note 77, at 31, 41; Resnik, supra note 76, at 125-26; Stipanowich, supra note 75, at 376, 380; Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility, FAA Preemption, and Class Arbitration, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 9:29 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-faa-preemption-and-class-arbitration/ (stating that the Court held Discover Bank to be preempted by the FAA because of its "anti-arbitration animus").
paradigm that is both more robust and more nuanced for purposes of addressing these new challenges.
The basic problem, however, is that there is so far no widely-accepted consensus about the details of this alternative paradigm. To be sure, the cases are replete with cryptic maxims that sound in a distinctively antidiscrimination register: "Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status"; 117 "the FAA is pre-emptive of state laws hostile to arbitration"; 118 the savings clause does not protect a judicial holding that "rel[ies] on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for" a determination of unconscionability.
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The most famous of these is perhaps the following:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal "footing," directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent.
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Most of us think we know what these maxims mean. We think we know, for example, how to spot a law that "takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue" 121 or that fails to place arbitration agreements on an "equal footing." But the truth is that we do not. We have been lulled into a false confidence about the nature, scope, and limits of these propositions and the legal arguments they can be expected to support. The litigation of Concepcion is a testament to this, and so it is to this issue that I now turn.
III. LITIGATING CONCEPCION: THE PERILS OF PROTO-THEORY
The parties' framing of the FAA preemption issue in terms of whether Discover Bank "discriminated" against arbitration forced the Court to confront a complex set of questions not just about the nature of the FAA's antidiscrimination mandate, but also about the circumstances in which a facially neutral law can be deemed to discriminate against arbitration by pretext.
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Not surprisingly, the justices surfaced many of these questions during oral argument. But upon reading the transcript of the argument, it becomes painfully evident that counsel on both sides lacked the analytic tools and even the vocabulary to engage them on a meaningful level. reason for this has less to do with the quality of counsel's representation-which by all accounts was first rate and which I do not mean to criticize here-and more to do with the dearth of conceptual resources available to them for constructing sophisticated antidiscrimination arguments.
My goal in this Part is to draw attention to and to critique the surprisingly underdeveloped state of the law in this area by focusing on three central questions that the parties were unable adequately to address during the litigation of Concepcion. Coming to grips with these questions will be indispensable if we are to have any hope of mastering the antidiscrimination theory of FAA preemption.
A. What is the Subject of Discrimination?
One of AT&T's leading arguments for why Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration was that, instead of applying across the board to all agreements under the sun, it only applied to a subset of agreements-namely, consumer contracts that contain class waivers. 123 In other words, the mere fact that some arbitration agreements fall within this subset while a whole range of other agreements do not (think of pharmaceutical, physician-patient, plumbing, prenuptial, prostate removal, and countless other agreements) is sufficient to establish discriminatory treatment. The obvious point that Discover Bank does not treat class waivers in arbitration any differently from those in litigation recedes into obscurity.
AT&T's flagship argument that a state law "discriminates" for FAA preemption purposes if it fails to "'place[] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts'" 124 is, however, hopelessly incoherent. No law-not even the defense of fraud or duress-applies in any meaningful sense, as one group of amici put it, to "'any' and every contract." 125 More to the point, the argument betrays a vital misunderstanding about the subject of the FAA's antidiscrimination mandate. Most courts and commentators assume that the FAA's purpose is to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts. But as I have already argued, making arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts was never an end in itself; rather, it was a means to enable the arbitration process to stand on an equal footing with litigation.
126 At root, therefore, the subject of the FAA's mandate must be the latter and not the former.
A simple example from the antidiscrimination context will explain. The claim that a prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge to exclude African Americans from petit criminal juries violates the Equal Protection Clause is at root a claim that eligible African Americans are being discriminated against in favor of a comparison group. The comparison group plainly cannot consist of all other individuals, for the peremptory challenge is inapplicable to whole classes of persons (non-citizen permanent residents, children, convicted felons in custody, persons who 123 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 17-18, 28-31. 124 have served in the past twelve months, and residents of other states, to name a few). Yet this lack of universal applicability hardly shakes our confidence in the prosecutor's evenhanded use of the challenge. What is relevant is only whether, given two or more groups whose members are functionally interchangeable in the sense that each could perform jury service in the same way, one is being disfavored for no reason other than race. 127 Thus, one way of raising an inference of race-based discrimination would be to show that the prosecutor used his peremptories more frequently against eligible African Americans than he did against eligible whites.
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Now consider three different contract clauses: (i) an arbitration clause containing a class arbitration waiver, (ii) an attorney fee-shifting clause, and (iii) a release of liability clause. Like the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge in my example, Discover Bank arguably has an adverse effect only on the arbitration clause; it has no application whatsoever to the other two or indeed to most other contract clauses. But the fact that Discover Bank does not apply in this way to "all" clauses is surely not what it means for Discover Bank to discriminate. We do not suspect, for instance, that the California Supreme Court devised the Discover Bank standard in order to enable more attorney fee-shifting clauses to be enforced or to encourage contract drafters to include more releases in their form contracts. Striking the arbitration clause as unconscionable does not somehow favor the other two clauses in the way that excluding eligible African Americans from jury service favors eligible whites. The reason is that the other clauses are not functionally interchangeable with the arbitration clause and thereby provide no salient comparison group for purposes of establishing discrimination.
To the extent that the facially neutral Discover Bank rule can be considered discriminatory at all, therefore, it must be because the rule treats arbitration and litigation differently for essentially arbitrary reasons-reasons that we suspect derive from the common law's legacy of "jealousy" toward the arbitral forum. 128 By contrast, evidence that African Americans in the jury venire were being disfavored relative to persons who wear crimson sweatshirts, persons whose last name begins with "A," or persons whose diet includes durian, without more, is of absolutely no moment until we know which of these persons were also members of the class of eligible whites. 129 Despite what may in hindsight appear to be a fairly obvious point, FAA preemption doctrine continues to exhibit a bewildering indecisiveness about something as foundational as the subject of its antidiscrimination principle. Consider that the essentially specious "all contracts" ratio has for more than ten years been the leading standard used by lower courts to determine whether facially neutral laws other than standard contract law defenses are preempted by the FAA. 133 The confusion is so widespread and unquestioned that not even AT&T saw through it clearly. If it had, it surely would not have led with an argument that even justices who joined the majority dismissed as a non-starter. 134 Instead, AT&T would have focused its efforts on developing an argument that was still inchoate in its brief but that eventually carried the day: the claim that Discover Bank, like the Court's parade of horribles, is tainted by the impermissible "assumption that arbitration cannot vindicate the public interest to the same extent as judicial class actions."
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Confusion about the subject of discrimination is problematic not simply because it breeds imprecision or inconsistency but because it tempts obfuscation. When courts mobilize the rhetoric of antidiscrimination to justify preempting state laws without being clear about the very subject of their purported solicitude, the resulting lack of transparency can be exploited to reach resultdriven decisions. Consider a forum selection statute, facially neutral in the way I describe above, 136 that voids any agreement by persons with little or no bargaining power (e.g., a franchisee or consumer) to resolve disputes outside her home state. The overwhelming majority of courts hold that such laws violate the maxim to place arbitration agreements on an "equal footing with all other contracts" 137 because the laws apply (i) only to forum selection clauses in (ii) only one type of contract (e.g., franchise, consumer). 138 What gets occluded by this analysis, of course, is that those laws still treat arbitration and litigation exactly the same.
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When the tables are turned, however, precisely the opposite argument is invoked. Thus, when the law at issue is a common law defense that (according to FAA lore) applies to all 133 See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1204-06. 134 Justices Scalia and Kennedy expressed incredulity at the argument, pointing out the obvious fact that most legislative enactments-including those that AT&T readily conceded were not discriminatory-do not in fact apply to "all" contracts. See Transcript, supra note 88, at 4, 11, 23 (Scalia, J.); id. at 22 (Kennedy, J.). I have elsewhere sought to show that the argument is fundamentally incoherent. See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1218-23; Brief of Arbitration Professors, supra note 50, at 25-29. The fact that two of the five justices in the majority signaled their strong inclination to reject the "all contracts" standard is perhaps one of the saving graces of Concepcion. 139 Moreover, the two are similarly situated with respect to the purpose behind such laws, which is to protect weaker parties from unfair hardship and to make it more difficult for stronger parties to evade liability for wrongful conduct.
contracts, those seeking preemption argue that the law "rests on nothing less than an assumption that arbitration, just because it is arbitration, is less desirable than litigation." 140 In other words, when it is no longer feasible to claim that arbitration agreements have been placed on a different footing than other contracts, the axis of comparison switches to arbitration vs. litigation. "Heads we win, tails you lose."
B. Is Discrimination Equivalent to Doctrinal Deviation?
AT&T's other leading argument was that Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration because it represented such a "distortion" of California unconscionability doctrine that "[w]e have not located a single precedential California decision" to support it. 141 The gravamen of this claim is not that Discover Bank merely extends or adapts the doctrine in questionable ways-ways that a reviewing court would leave undisturbed. 142 Instead, it is that Discover Bank is unprecedented and erroneous as a matter of law, among other things because it considers the fairness of a clause (i) to persons who are not parties to the agreement and (ii) in light of subsquent events, rather than events at the time of contracting.
143 These "significant" and "extreme" doctrinal "deviat[ions]" 144 from settled unconscionability principles, AT&T argued, are sufficient to "demonstrate[] impermissible discrimination." 145 But a moment's thought should reveal that there is no necessary connection between discrimination and doctrinal error. Incorrect applications of the law may well be considered nondiscriminatory, as when laws are misapplied because of incompetence, oversight, or a selfconfessed desire to further other, more important ends. And depending on how discrimination is defined, even incorrect applications that produce starkly disproportionate outcomes, if unaccompanied by improper motives, may not count as discriminatory.
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By the same token, correct applications of the law may well be discriminatory. A good example of this is Batson v. Kentucky, 147 the inspiration for my previous example involving the 140 McGuinness & Karr, supra note 94, at 83; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 31, at 25, 29; Burton, supra note 94, at 486, 488; Randall, supra note 94, at 198-220 (arguing that hostility in the application of the unconscionability rule may be inferred from stark differences in the way courts assess the fairness of a dispute resolution term relating to arbitration versus litigation). The flip side of this is that courts find no hostility, and thus no FAA preemption, when the unconscionability defense appears to be applied in a manner that does not "express the impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation . Equipped with a more sophisticated account of discrimination under the FAA, AT&T might have marshaled a much stronger argument: Even if Discover Bank were a perfectly valid application or "refinement" of longstanding unconscionability principles (as the Concepcions and their amici had contended), it was still discriminatory and thus preempted. 148 The argument was hardly beyond contemplation. A loud chorus of courts and commentators has increasingly warned that unconscionability is being used as a ruse for a "new judicial hostility" toward arbitration.
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In its strongest form, the contention is not so much that courts are getting the law of unconscionability wrong (even though, for want of a better alternative, this is indeed how many have framed it).
150 Instead, it is that the absence of bright line rules in the unconscionability area allows them to get it right and thereby to perpetuate the legacy of anti-arbitration hostility in ways that escape easy detection.
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Using doctrinal deviation as a proxy for discrimination did not just prevent AT&T from advancing much stronger arguments. Crucially, it also collapsed the federal preemption inquiry into a question of state contract law. 152 This effectively put AT&T in the odious position of asking the Court to review the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank decision on the merits-a request that even AT&T must have realized was deeply problematic from a federalism 148 By the same token, the Concepcions might have argued that, even if AT&T were correct that the California Supreme Court had misapplied established unconscionability principles in Discover Bank, there were other, perfectly plausible explanations for this having nothing to do with discrimination. But they did not. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 31-39. The reason for this, again, is not a failing on counsel's part; instead, it stems from the problem that FAA jurisprudence currently lacks the doctrinal and theoretical resources with which to construct such an antidiscrimination-based argument. 149 perspective. 153 The fact that AT&T persisted with the argument all the same speaks volumes about the reigning confusion over what it means to "discriminate" for purposes of FAA preemption.
Here one might reasonably ask how AT&T and others who fear the pretextual use of the unconscionability doctrine can prove discrimination without the crutch of doctrinal misapplication. An answer is suggested by a distinctive characteristic of pretext claims that we considered earlier: They presuppose intentional discriminatory treatment. As such, it should be possible to demonstrate that an adverse unconscionability determination, even if doctrinally unremarkable, was nonetheless motivated by impermissible hostility to arbitration. 154 For instance, a court might enunciate the familiar unconscionability rule yet apply it in a way that betrays "outmoded presumptions" about arbitration's inferiority to litigation. 155 A court might also drop other hints in its opinion that suggest a visceral rather than reasoned opposition to arbitration. 156 A good example of the former is the California Supreme Court's much-discussed opinion in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.
157 Armendariz raises far fewer doctrinal red flags than Discover Bank. But because the holding in Armendariz rests in part on questionable assumptions about arbitration's competence and desirability as a dispute resolution forum, it is arguably beset by the same anti-arbitration hostility prohibited by the FAA.
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A final retort is that doctrinal irregularities and departures from the ordinary course, without more, are sometimes sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. 159 Although this is certainly true, AT&T was not making this much more subtle point. Even if it were, it failed to offer persuasive reasons for drawing such an inference in the case of Discover Bank. In particular, it did not even attempt to explain how and why the doctrinal deviations it identified might be indicative of hostility specifically toward arbitration rather than toward class waivers. 160 Recall that Discover Bank does not apply only to arbitration clauses or even to all arbitration clauses; its 153 Many justices expressed strong disinclination even to entertain AT&T's claim that Discover Bank was erroneous as a matter of California state law. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 88, at 5, 7 (Scalia, J.) ("Are we going to tell the State of California what it has to consider unconscionable?"); id. at 8 (Ginsburg, J.); id. at 19 (Kagan, J.); id. at 21 (Breyer, J.); id. at 24 (Sotomayor, J.). 154 See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1293-1303. 155 This, indeed, is the approach followed by many courts when holding that a particular application of the unconscionability defense is not discriminatory and thus saved from preemption by the FAA. 156 Accord Bruhl, supra note 152, at 1451-52 (suggesting that "anti-arbitration comments" by a court may be sufficient to establish a discriminatory application of the unconscionability defense). For a good example, see Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (describing the "total lack of procedural safeguards" in arbitration and blaming arbitration of "subvert[ing] our system of justice as we have come to know it."), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
157 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) . 158 See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1300-02. 159 Even in the equal protection context, departures from the ordinary course are not sufficient in themselves to warrant the inference; the court must also consider the totality of the circumstances. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1977) . 160 real target is class waivers in consumer contracts. Thus, even when Discover Bank is used to void such a waiver, there are no necessary ramifications for the promise to arbitrate because courts may still order the case to class arbitration (as many have). 161 Moreover, Discover Bank imposes the identical restriction on class waivers in the litigation process. Something more is therefore needed to support the conclusion that Discover Bank's irregularities (if any) "express the impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation." 162 Doctrinal departures alone do not get us there.
C. Purpose-or Effects-Based Discrimination?
Mature antidiscrimination theories broadly recognize the distinction between intent-based and impact-based discrimination, and they make a self-conscious choice to rectify one or the other (or sometimes both). For instance, the heightened scrutiny afforded to suspect and quasisuspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of invidious purpose; the mere fact that the law's impact "may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white" 163 is insufficient. By contrast, reasonable accommodation claims and statutory "disparate impact" claims seek to rectify more than purposeful discrimination. They therefore require no proof of intent; the only relevant question is whether a particular measure produces a certain type or degree of unequal outcome. 164 In the FAA context there has been comparatively little if any consideration of whether the FAA's antidiscrimination principle is aimed at remedying the law's purposeful disparate treatment of arbitration or merely its unintended effects on arbitration. Courts and commentators routinely blur this distinction, as a result of which the all-important question of just what must be proven to establish discrimination has remained largely unasked and unanswered.
This basic ambiguity about whether the FAA represents a purpose-or effects-based antidiscrimination regime haunted the litigation of Concepcion from start to finish. Justice Kagan put her finger on it during oral argument, when she pointedly asked counsel whether the test for discrimination under the FAA was "a purpose test or an effects test." That is, "[i]s it a test that says the State is doing this in order to kill arbitration, or is it a test that says the State is doing something that will kill arbitration?" 165 What is striking as one reads the transcript of oral argument is that counsel did not appear to have the first idea about how to answer this question. The state of confusion surrounding this critical issue, in turn, had strategic consequences for both parties.
For example, in response to Justice Kagan's question, counsel for the Concepcions stated that "I think you can look to both." 166 In other words, either purpose or effects might be sufficient, which is the same as saying that proof of discriminatory purpose is strictly unnecessary. As the party resisting the charge of discrimination, however, the Concepcions should have argued precisely the opposite. Discriminatory intent, after all, is extremely difficult to establish because it must almost always be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 167 By following this strategy, the Concepcions would have put AT&T to the test of proving not just that class-wide relief happens to place intolerable burdens on arbitration, but that the California Supreme Court willed those burdens when it issued its ruling back in 2005-a time, moreover, when class arbitration did not seem especially antithetical to arbitration. 168 But the Concepcions did not adopt this strategy even though it was perfectly viable given the way the Court and AT&T had characterized Discover Bank as a pretext. 169 At best, the Concepcions seemed hazy, sometimes arguing that Discover Bank should avoid preemption because it was not "aimed at destroying arbitration" 170 and at other times contending that the mere fact that it destroys arbitration was sufficient. 171 At worst, they affirmatively endorsed an effectsbased paradigm. This surfaced most clearly in the Concepcions' attempts to distinguish Discover Bank from AT&T's parade of horribles. In their brief, the Concepcions argued that the latter were preempted because they "demand[ed] procedures incompatible with arbitration" and would thereby end up "destroy[ing]" the FAA unless they were preempted. 172 Likewise, they suggested that the problem with the ouster rule (which they assimilated to the parade of horribles) was its "discriminatory effect[s]" on arbitration 173 rather than, as is commonly supposed, the antiarbitration motives behind those effects.
174 By focusing on effects at the expense of purpose, these arguments reduced the resolution of the case to one of simple line-drawing: Does Discover Bank burden arbitration to quite the same degree as the parade of horribles? Ironically, it was the Concepcions' own framing of the issue in this way that led an exasperated Justice Alito to foretell the outcome of the case in this exchange with the Concepcions' counsel during oral argument:
What is the difference . . . between a rule that says you must follow the rules of evidence in every adjudication and a rule that says that class adjudication must always be available? I think your answer comes down to the proposition that the former is inconsistent with the idea of arbitration, and therefore, that's why it's not allowed, and the latter is not inconsistent with the idea of arbitration, and therefore, it is allowed. . . . [I]n the end . . . . we have to make a value judgment about whether these things, one thing or the other, fits with arbitration. That's what it comes down to.
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For its part, AT&T appeared just as confused as the Concepcions about the purpose/effects distinction and its importance to the outcome of the case. AT&T took the state of California to task for intentionally targeting arbitration, not for devising well-meaning rules that unexpectedly interfered with the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 176 The ostensibly "even-handed" Discover Bank rule, in its view, was "gerrymandered to target arbitration provisions," 177 Similarly, when comparing Discover Bank to the parade of horribles, AT&T suggested that the 172 Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 32. Even a "mere preference for procedures that are incompatible with arbitration," they argued, would be preempted. See id. at 33. This makes proof of calculated hostility to arbitration strictly unnecessary, because a state's "mere preference" for a procedure might stem from a variety of arbitrationneutral considerations including tradition, economic efficiency, or a concern about the reasonable expectations of parties. The real reason behind the claim that even a "mere preference" would be preempted must, therefore, be that incompatibility alone is sufficient to warrant preemption. 173 Id. at 33-34. 174 See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1250-54. 175 Transcript, supra note 88, at 46-47 (Alito, J.) (emphasis added). 176 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 42. 177 Id. at 20; see also id. at 40. 178 Id. at 29; see also id. at 42. 179 Id. at 47; see also id. at 50-51. 180 Id. at 41 (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959) for the proposition that "the FAA was enacted to overrule 'a great variety' of judicial 'devices and formulas' declaring arbitration agreements 'against public policy'"); see also id. at 32. problem with the latter was the bad motives they betrayed rather than their destructive effect on arbitration.
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A far easier and more direct route to proving discrimination would have been to piggy back on the Concepcions' argument by contending that Discover Bank's devastating effect on arbitration, without more, was sufficient to prove discrimination. 182 This was certainly a plausible contention.
183 AT&T was moreover astute enough to realize that Justice Scalia, at least, would have been receptive to it given the tenor of his questions during oral argument in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 184 the other High Court case to address class arbitration. There, he asked: "Why isn't the Federal Arbitration Act more reasonably interpreted as directed at those State laws that . . . are destructive of arbitration, that . . . are hostile not in the sense of any . . . mental intent, but that in their operation make it difficult for parties to enter into arbitration agreements?" 185 Sure enough, the majority's opinion-authored by none other than Justice Scalia-adopted precisely this effects-based standard. 186 For rather than attempt to determine whether Discover Bank, like the hypothetical laws in the parade of horribles, disguised a purpose to discriminate, the majority characterized those laws as "fundamentally incompatible" with arbitration and simply asked whether Discover Bank was likewise incompatible.
IV. THE MAJORITY'S REASONING: A CRITIQUE AND RECONSTRUCTION
The parties' above-described handicaps in presenting persuasive accounts of what makes Discover Bank discriminatory (or not) for FAA preemption purposes left the Court largely to its own devices when deciding the case. Notably, even though it agreed with the result advocated by 181 Id. at 50 (describing the parade of horribles as evincing a "concern[] that traditional arbitration hinders parties situated similarly to the plaintiff from learning of infringements of their legal rights," or a "convi[ction] of the superiority of jury trials"). Likewise, AT&T's amici argued that Discover Bank and other California unconscionability precedents evince a purpose to "target arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment." Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 31, at 10. 182 To be sure, AT&T argued in passing that Discover Bank had a disparate "impact" on arbitration because it had the "effect . . . [of] transfor[ming] arbitration in the ways the Court described in Stolt Nielsen." Transcript, supra note 88, at 10; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 21, 30-31. But these remarks were so understated that they sound more like afterthoughts or arguments made for the sake of completeness. It is moreover unclear whether AT&T meant to say that these disparate impacts are important for drawing an inference of intentional discrimination or whether they are sufficiently actionable in themselves. For instance, AT&T argued that Discover Bank's disparate impact on arbitration would "as a practical matter allow use of 'the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.'" Id. at 30-31. Because a state would only consider the uniqueness of an arbitration agreement if it intended to target arbitration, the argument suggests that impacts are simply a means of establishing intent. 186 Accord Marks, supra note 77, at 43-44.
AT&T, the majority did not incorporate or rely on any of AT&T's leading arguments. 187 Instead, it held that Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration because the rule imposed a procedure that had the effect of destroying arbitration.
In this Part, I argue that the Court's adoption of an effects-based standard of discrimination-and, more importantly, its reliance on essentialism to vindicate that standardwas a mistake for reasons that extend far beyond the confines of this particular case. I then argue that the Court should have stayed true to its longstanding position that the FAA was enacted to reverse the "'old judicial law hostility to arbitration'" 188 by asking whether Discover Bank evinced a discriminatory purpose.
A. The Causes and Consequences of Essentialism
A keystone of the Court's holding in Concepcion is the assertion that class arbitration is not really "arbitration." Class-wide relief, we are told, produces a "structural" change that "interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration."
189 Class arbitration is time consuming, formalistic, and procedurally complex-all the things that arbitration under the FAA is neither supposed to be nor likely can be. These and similar claims in the Court's decision are problematic not so much because they are empirically dubious 190 as because they unnecessarily essentialize arbitration: They purport to identify, once and for all, certain constitutive or definitional features of the arbitral process.
It may be tempting here to think of this essentialism as following inescapably from the Court's decision one year earlier in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International. 191 There, the Court opined that class proceedings were inconsistent with the very "nature of arbitration," such that the shift from bilateral to class-wide arbitration would change the arbitral process in 187 See supra notes 134, 153 and accompanying text. Although it is true that the parade of horribles originated in AT&T's brief, AT&T did not use it to make an affirmative argument that Discover Bank was discriminatory. Rather, AT&T used it to rebut the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Discover Bank should withstand preemption because it applied equally to arbitration and litigation. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 31, at 28-31. The mere fact that a state law applied to both forums, AT&T argued, could not be dispositive of the discrimination question because one can imagine many such laws that are clearly inimical to the FAA, such as a law requiring the use of jury trials in any dispute resolution context. Thus, AT&T's argument was fundamentally defensive in nature. "fundamental" ways. 192 These sweeping pronouncements likely informed the majority's analysis in Concepcion. But as others have noted, they did not preordain that analysis. 193 An alternative or perhaps more compelling explanation for Concepcion's essentialism is that it helps establish that arbitration and litigation are differently situated, such that treating them exactly the same (as Discover Bank does) amounts to a type of discrimination. 194 Using the FAA to preempt Discover Bank then begins to look perfectly consistent with the goal of nondiscrimination, because it effectively allows the two forums to be treated differently in ways that reflect their essential differences.
195 From this standpoint, Concepcion appears simply to reaffirm the principle that "[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike."
196 If this is, in fact, the underlying logic of the majority's reasoning in Concepcion, then it is a very complex logic indeed, one that raises more questions than it answers and one whose consequences must be carefully considered.
It may be helpful here to look at how claims of equality predicated on the need for differential treatment-rather than on the default rule of similar treatment-have played out in more traditional antidiscrimination contexts. The dominant paradigm of American antidiscrimination law perceives the wrong of discrimination in terms of a failure to recognize our inherent sameness across race, gender, and other status-based categories.
197 It constructs a world in which men and women are presumed to have the same ability to become, say, firefighters or care givers; a world in which African-Americans and whites are presumed interchangeable for purposes of becoming office managers or jurors.
198 Status-based differences are thereby rendered irrelevant; what matters is simply the individual's functional capacity to perform the task at hand.
presents an especially salient context in which "innate physical differences between the sexes" 200 are such that treating men and women the same may sometimes be intolerable or, worse, impossible.
201 For example, the Court has relied on the biological fact that only women bear children in order to uphold state statutes that treat unwed mothers and fathers differently when it comes to parental rights. 202 It has also upheld the exclusion of women from such things as the draft and liability for statutory rape because of supposed "fundamental" and "physiological" differences between the sexes in matters relating to military combat and sexual predation.
203
Many feminists supported these decisions. They argued that even if the decisions rested on gender-based stereotypes, those stereotypes were often overwhelmingly accurate: Women do, in fact, take primary responsibility for the nurture and care of children (often at great sacrifice to their own professional advancement), and they are statistically far more likely than males to be victims of physical and sexual aggression.
204 Some feminists also warned that by demanding similar treatment to men in these contexts, women would on a deeper level risk "betraying 201 For example, if some women but no men become pregnant, how can the sexes be considered similarly situated for purposes of pregnancy benefits or exclusions? And if they cannot, is it so inconsistent with the norm of equality to fail to treat them the same for such purposes? Or might true equality demand even more, by imposing an affirmative duty to treat them differently? See generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985) (arguing that biological differences make it literally impossible to treat men and women equally in certain contexts); Law, supra note 197 (arguing that unavoidable biological differences such as pregnancy must be taken into account in order to achieve true equality between the sexes). 202 The rationale is that childbirth almost always makes the woman an identifiable parent and the primary caretaker, whereas the father's identity may never be discovered or he may never assume any responsibilities in child rearing. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (finding no equal protection violation in a law that required unmarried fathers, but not mothers, to legitimate their children as a condition for filing a wrongful death claim); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (finding that because men and women are " [not] in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child," a statute that accorded unwed fathers fewer rights than unwed mothers in adoption proceedings did not violate the equal protection clause); cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 399 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (relying on the "physical reality" and the "undeniable social reality that the unwed mother is always an identifiable parent and the custodian of the child" to defend a law that gave unmarried mothers (but not fathers) the right to block the adoption of their biological children). 203 grounded in an ethic of care and relationship as contrasted with a (perceived) male ethic of aggression and individualism. 206 This consciousness, in turn, led women to envision a nonassimilationist, "difference theory" of equality, one that did not require women to become like men in order to be equal to them. 207 By taking the position that arbitration and litigation are inherently different for purposes of class-wide relief, Concepcion traces its pedigree to something like the difference theory. From this perspective, it represents a more evolved state of thinking about the FAA's antidiscrimination mandate because it avoids the facile presumption that arbitration and litigation must always be treated the same in order to be placed on an "equal footing." But Concepcion is also problematic because it reifies differences that are arguably contingent and mutable. This, in turn, exposes it to the same critique of essentialism that has long been the Achilles' heel of difference theory. 208 Thus, many feminists have argued that the Court's more recent, difference-based equal protection cases-even those that favor women by exempting them from requirements otherwise applicable to men-are in truth scarcely distinguishable from paternalistic decisions from the turn of the century that rested on deeply suspicious stereotypes about the 'fairer sex. ' 209 Clearest among these were early cases that restricted women's choices in the world of work-a world traditionally dominated by men. In Muller v. Oregon, 210 for instance, the Court upheld a statute making it a crime to employ women (but not men) in certain establishments for more than ten hours per day, even if the women wished to work longer. The rationale was that a woman's "physical organization," "maternal functions," and role in child rearing and "the maintenance of the home" placed her in a position "inherent[ly] differen [t] " from that of a man. 211 Only in more recent times would the Court come to appreciate the way that Muller and cases like it used the supposedly inexorable dictates of biology to legitimize arrangements that are now recognized as socially and historically contingent. 212 results,'" 213 and professes to protect that virtue from perceived threats such as Discover Bank. But it is precisely the notion that arbitration has a fixed telos waiting to be discovered that is so dangerously susceptible to abuse. Consider Wilko v. Swan, 214 a case that those who support Concepcion tend to consider a low point in the history of federal arbitration law. In words strikingly evocative of Concepcion, the Court in Wilko held that arbitration's primary "advantage[]" in "secur[ing] prompt, economical and adequate" decisions made it correspondingly unsuited to decide weighty and complicated issues under the federal securities laws. 215 Similarly, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 216 the Court opined that "it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts." 217 These status-based judgments "centered on the nature of arbitration" 218 have been used time and again to justify invalidating broadly worded arbitration agreements. 219 They also fuel the claims of some of arbitration's fiercest critics: " [T] here is inherent in the institutions of private dispute resolution an endemic disinclination to enforce legal rights rigorously"; 220 there is a "total lack of procedural safeguards inherent in the arbitration process"; 221 "
[n]ow we all know, that arbitrators . . . . are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated cases." 222 By resurrecting similar generalizations about arbitration's essence-generalizations that are likely no longer even empirically accurate 223 -Concepcion is a case study in how easily the (otherwise legitimate) concern for difference can be co-opted in ways that undermine rather than support the goal of nondiscrimination. 224 Concepcion's essentialism is further problematic because it reinforces what in the gender context has been described as a "separate spheres ideology." 225 Men and women are so ineluctably different, the argument goes, that they can be equal only in their separate and mutually exclusive realms. The answer to man's domination in the sphere of work or politics is therefore not to make woman an equal participant in the same sphere, but rather to give her dominion over an entirely different sphere-that of the hearth and home. 226 To merge the spheres would so upset the essential order of things that women would stop marrying and procreating, and the species would face imminent extinction. 227 The almost apocalyptic fear behind these contentions is of a piece with the fear of racial amalgamation that lies barely concealed beneath the surface of Plessy v. Ferguson. 228 In both contexts, separateness is used to justify equality in form but subordination in substance. 229 This same amalgamation anxiety animates Concepcion. It is evident, for instance, in the Court's suggestion that once states are permitted to make class-wide relief non-waivable in arbitration, it is a short step to state laws that require arbitration proceedings to incorporate jury fact finding or judicially monitored discovery. 230 It drives AT&T's prediction that unless Discover Bank were preempted as to class arbitration waivers, states could "'chip away at [the FAA] by indirection,'" and thereby "kill arbitration by converting it into litigation." 231 And it is latent in other recent decisions from the Court, such as Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 232 that seek to enforce a clear boundary between the respective provinces of arbitral and judicial proceedings.
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To be sure, there are compelling policy reasons for advocating a "separate but equal" approach in the arbitration area in a way that does not obtain in the context of race. No matter what we believe (or are told by the Court to believe) about arbitration's capacity to function as a surrogate for litigation in the vast majority of civil cases, there are certain undeniable architectural differences between the two forums-differences that make it impossible for arbitration to function in all the ways that a court of law can (and vice versa). 234 The point is just that what we take to be "real" differences are not ideologically neutral but are more often than not self-fulfilling. 235 Care must therefore be taken before using essentialism to justify exceptionalism. As just one example of this danger, consider the way in which the Court manages to exaggerate the differences between litigation and arbitration by eliding the extent to which collective actions are arguably just as incompatible with the former as they are with the latter.
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For example, the rigorous requirements for class certification 237 judgment is borne out by extant (but admittedly sparse) empirical data suggesting that well below half of all putative class actions are certified. 239 In language reminiscent of Concepcion, scholars such as Martin Redish have claimed that "all class action models . . . should be rejected because they ignore, undermine, or dilute fundamental notions of process-based individual autonomy that are essential to the functioning of a civil justice system." 240 Likewise, when the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were issued, many viewed them as doing "more to change the face of federal practice than any other procedural development of the twentieth century, including the promulgation of the Civil Rules in 1938." 241 As in Concepcion, the fear was that class actions would make "litigation so complex as to be beyond the power of judicial tribunals to adjudicate on any rational basis." 242 By showcasing the way that class-wide relief conflicts with arbitration while suppressing the way in which it is likewise incompatible with litigation, therefore, the Court manages to invent differences that are not necessary or unavoidable. This, in turn, downplays the important ways in which the two adjudicative forums are the same and thus the reasons why they should be regulated accordingly.
Once we commit ourselves to Concepcion's premise that certain things commonly associated with litigation such as the class mechanism or the Federal Rules of Evidence frustrate the essence of arbitration, it seems to me we must now begin to re-evaluate many things that we previously took for granted. For example, the state of Illinois requires that in certain circumstances, the "Rules of Evidence that apply in the circuit court for placing medical opinions into evidence shall govern" in motor vehicle insurance coverage arbitrations. 243 California deems incorporated into every agreement to arbitrate wrongful death or injury claims "a right to take depositions and to obtain discovery" in the same manner and to the same extent available in a comparable action pending before a superior court. 244 Some regulatory bodies, trade associations, and dispute resolution providers not only prohibit waivers of, but affirmatively require, certain procedural protections similar (but not identical) to what might be found in litigation, such as (a) a right to discovery, 245 (b) a right to file a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, 246 (c) a right of appeal to an appellate arbitration panel, 247 (d) a right to peremptory and cause-based challenges to appointed arbitrators, 248 (e) a right to permissive joinder and consolidation, 249 and (f) a right to written, publicly available awards. 250 These are all examples of imposing litigation-like procedures in arbitration-procedures that, after Concepcion, appear just as incompatible with arbitration as does the class mechanism. 251 Are they likewise preempted or otherwise displaced by the FAA?
A similar set of questions arises when, over the objection of one side, an arbitrator relies on state or federal rules of evidence or procedure in a way that affects the outcome of a case. 252 If the imposition of such rules of decision is fundamentally incompatible with the arbitration process after Concepcion, may the disappointed party now successfully argue for vacatur of the resulting award on the ground that the arbitrator has "exceed [her] powers" or violated (federal) public policy? 253 These are serious and viable questions in a post-Concepcion world. If rules that operate to ensure fairness in the default context of litigation conflict with the very definition of arbitration, then efforts to regulate procedural fairness in arbitration (whether by states, private regulatory bodies, or arbitrators themselves) that are modeled on such rules will be prone to attack as underhanded attempts to conform arbitration to litigation's image. Courts will increasingly use FAA preemption as an excuse to exempt arbitration from rules such as Discover Bank while continuing to enforce those rules in the litigation context. Efforts to uphold the same minimum standards in both forums will thereby be stymied. This perpetuates the very discrimination that the Court claims it seeks to eradicate because it reinforces arbitration's separate sphere-a sphere in which the usual standards of fairness do not apply (and, after Concepcion, cannot apply without destroying the very nature of arbitration under the FAA).
Now consider the problem presented by the opposite of Discover Bank-laws that forbid rather than impose class arbitration, or that prohibit rather than require use of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Such laws would upset the contractual expectations of parties who currently incorporate all manner of litigation-like rules and procedures into their arbitration agreements: not just class-wide relief, 254 but also appellate review, 255 comprehensive discovery, 256 the federal rules of evidence 257 and even the federal rules of civil procedure. 258 The Court has emphasized time and again that "[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit." 259 The FAA should therefore preempt state laws that seek to curtail that freedom of contract. But after Concepcion, it is difficult to appreciate how a law that merely forbids the very things that the Court believes are fundamentally incompatible with arbitration's true nature can possibly frustrate the FAA's purpose.
This second set of examples highlights the way in which the Court's preoccupation with arbitration's status belies its purported fealty to freedom of contract in matters arbitration. Just as Muller restricted women's choices in the sphere of employment, so Concepcion threatens one of the cardinal virtues of arbitration: the freedom it affords in the design of a disputing process. Modern arbitration law has largely been organized around vindicating this freedom by enabling arbitration to become whatever the contracting parties agreed it would become-even if this means it might never become anything at all. 260 By contrast, Concepcion returns arbitration to the yoke of status. It implies that an agreement audacious enough to contemplate inefficient and complex class procedures does not deserve the FAA's protection. 261 Freedom of contract and favoritism toward arbitration, in other words, are ultimately qualified-they are to be pursued only in the name of a particular conception of arbitration as a quick and dirty version of litigation.
B. The Touchstone of Intentional Discrimination
My goal in the prior section was to explain Concepcion's essentialism as a classic antidiscrimination move, one that nonetheless comes with significant and well-known costs that our experience in the gender discrimination context suggests are not worth paying. In this section, I seek to show that these costs did not need to be (and should not have been) paid in the first place.
The Court used essentialism to answer the question of how we tell whether a facially neutral law "discriminates" against arbitration. It was led down this path, however, only because it mistakenly ended up focusing on "disproportionate impact" as the touchstone for discrimination 262 -that is, on Discover Bank's de facto unequal treatment of arbitration and litigation in the way that it imposes on both forums a procedure that is fundamentally incompatible only with the former. This overlooks a much more compelling alternative, which was to focus on whether California's context-specific unconscionability rule constituted de jure discrimination. Doing so would have forced the Court to make good on its own claim that Discover Bank exhibits the same "judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA [and that] had manifested itself in 'a great variety' of 'devices and formulas' declaring arbitration against public policy." 263 fewer claims of discrimination against arbitration will survive, and thus that fewer state laws will suffer preemption. 270 By declaring that class arbitration is incompatible with arbitration's true nature, the Court managed to find a colorable ground for conflict with the FAA without delving into the messier question of whether that conflict was haphazard or the product of improper motives. For if a state law can be described as striking at the essence of arbitration, it does not seem to matter much whether it does so through hostility or by accident. In either case, the FAA's purposes and objectives would appear to be quite clearly frustrated. But notice that the reason why they are frustrated has now changed: It is no longer that the state law in question functions as a pretext, perpetuating anti-arbitration policies behind the guise of a facially neutral regulation, as AT&T had originally claimed. Instead, it is that the law-however well-intentioned toward arbitrationhas managed to turn arbitration into something that it plainly is not. 271 Had the requirement to prove purposeful discrimination been better appreciated by the litigants and the Court, it would have provided a clean and simple way to distinguish Discover Bank from AT&T's parade of horribles. These hypothetical laws are problematic not because they just happen to produce disparate impacts on arbitration. Rather, they are problematic because we suspect them to be predicated on little more than knee-jerk litigation chauvinism: the bare assumption that only the judicial forum-or features designed for that forum or otherwise unique to it, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence and jury fact-finding-is adequate to resolve certain types of consumer claims. 272 In order to analogize Discover Bank to these examples, it would need to be fairly evident that Discover Bank likewise purposefully discriminates against arbitration. But even if it could be taken to "impose" class arbitration, 273 Discover Bank does not dictate the particular form that such a procedure must take. It does not, for instance, require the wholesale importation of judicial class action rules and procedures such as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the arbitration context, and so does not betray the same type of chauvinism evident in the parade of horribles. The most that can be said about Discover Bank is that it mandates the availability of some type of class mechanism (and then only if the Concepcions could satisfy the requirements for class certification). Because the parties had agreed to arbitrate before the American Arbitration Association (AAA), that mechanism would have conformed to the AAA's class arbitration rules. 274 But it did not need to. AT&T could just as well have drafted its own class arbitration rules, thereby protecting itself from all of the defense-side risks cited by the Court to defend its preemption holding. Alternatively, the arbitrator could have been entrusted to formulate a class arbitration procedure that stayed true to the supposed essential virtues of arbitration. Or the parties could have agreed on a class arbitration procedure after the fact, which likely would have been sufficient to protect the integrity of the process, at least from AT&T's perspective. 275 Absent further explanation, therefore, Discover Bank does not betray any necessary hostility to arbitration.
Given these features of Discover Bank, a more appropriate comparison for the Court to draw would have been to (a) laws requiring the availability of some type of discovery process or evidentiary rules in arbitration and litigation, rather than to (b) laws requiring the availability specifically of judicially monitored discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence. But it is not entirely clear that laws falling within category (a) are all that hostile to arbitration. 276 Most arbitral providers allow each party some minimal discovery, 277 and arbitral awards would likely be vacated if relevant material evidence were arbitrarily excluded. 278 Moreover, because laws falling within category (a) impose the same generic restrictions in the litigation context, it suggests that they were intended to regulate the applicable process feature (discovery, evidence rules, etc.) rather than the particular forum in which those features are used. If Discover Bank is analogous to these laws, it follows from my argument that Discover Bank also does not evince the type of purposeful discrimination toward arbitration that the FAA was designed to reverse.
As the party seeking preemption based on a pretext theory, AT&T bore the burden to rebut this conclusion-to prove that a rule that declares class waivers unconscionable to the same extent in arbitration as in litigation somehow purposefully discriminates only against arbitration. In more traditional antidiscrimination contexts, a plaintiff asserting a claim of pretext is typically required to prove not just that employers or state actors were aware of the consequences of their 274 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009). True, the AAA modeled its rules after Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. But the same can be said for other rules commonly used in arbitration, such as those relating to discovery and appeal to an appellate arbitration panel. These rules have been in use for decades; yet nobody has thought to claim that they somehow change the fundamental nature of arbitration simply because they were modeled on a rule of court procedure.
275 By contrast, the Court's conclusion that class arbitration is fundamentally inconsistent with arbitration implies that no type of class arbitration, no matter how well tailored to the arbitral process, can get off the ground without vitiating the entire enterprise of FAA arbitration itself. It amounts to a ruling that the class mechanism is not a legitimate feature of adjudication generally, but is rather so intimately bound up with the litigation process that making it nonwaivable in other adjudicative forums would effectively convert those forums into litigation.
276 This is especially so where, as here, the application of such laws is further limited to "consumer contract[s] of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money." Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) . 277 See supra note 245. actions on protected groups but that they affirmatively intended those consequences. 279 AT&T made nothing close to this showing, however. 280 The majority should, therefore, have held that AT&T had failed to discharge its burden to prove discrimination, as it has been apt to do in more traditional discrimination contexts. 281 Instead, the majority decided the FAA preemption issue by speculating about the effect that class actions would have on arbitration's essential nature, thereby relieving itself and AT&T from inquiring into discriminatory intention. In form, therefore, Concepcion amounts to a type of reasonable accommodation decision: It exempts arbitration from a neutral, generally applicable rule such as Discover Bank based solely on a perceived intolerable tension between the rule and the "essence" of arbitration.
282 From the standpoint of an antidiscrimination theory of FAA preemption, this was the crucial mistake in Concepcion.
V.
CONCLUSION
In a trenchant critique of the majority's opinion, Alan Scott Rau argues that "whatever one can possibly spin out of all this in the way of 'doctrine' begins to seem increasingly pointless . . . . [because] we are clearly quite far here from anything that bears a recognizable resemblance to any neutral and informed process of adjudication." 283 By contrast, in this Article I have argued that Concepcion is in fact organized around a distinct logic of antidiscrimination-a logic that, while perhaps still unrefined and poorly understood, makes a claim to neutrality and principle nonetheless.
It is time for us to take that logic seriously. For far too long, our failure to do so at both the practitioner and academic levels has allowed courts and litigants to exploit ambiguities and lacunae in our collective understanding of that logic to justify partisan, result-driven outcomes. A more sophisticated engagement with that logic, I argue, opens up an avenue for holding courts and litigants to the full implications of their own antidiscrimination-based arguments and holdings. This, I hope, will help place sensible limits on the FAA's preemption of state law.
